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David D. Jackson* and Will Ford Hartnett**
HIS Article surveys cases that offer varying degrees of enlightenment
concerning wills, nontestamentary transfers, estates, heirship, trusts,
and guardianships. The opinions discussed in this Article were pub-
lished during the twelve month-period ending October 15, 1985. This article
also comments on changes that the Sixty-Ninth Texas Legislature made to
the Texas Probate and Trust Codes.
I. WILLS
Execution of a Will. The supreme court in Orrell v. Cochran' upheld the
iron rule set forth in Boren v. Boren2 that proponents of a will cannot use
signatures contained in a self-proving affidavit to validate the will. The court
in Boren had considered whether the proponent of a will could supply signa-
tures of witnesses from an executed self-proving affidavit. Orrell dealt with
the attempted similar use of a testator's signature. In both cases the court
held that the will and the self-proving affidavit were completely separate in-
struments, 3 and that the execution of a valid will is an absolute prerequisite
to the usefulness of the self-proving affidavit.
Despite the general rules that favor testacy over intestacy 4 and that allow
a testator to sign the will on any page,5 the supreme court continues to inter-
pret Probate Code section 596 to separate the self-proving affidavit from the
will. 7 The supreme court indicated that the testamentary intent behind a
self-proving affidavit is immaterial.8 Although the court in Orrell clearly
* B.A., J.D, Southern Methodist University. Judge, Probate Court No. 2, Dallas
County, Texas.
** B.A., Harvard University; J.D., University of Texas. Attorney at Law, James J. Hart-
nett, P.C.
1. 695 S.W.2d 552 (Tex. 1985).
2. 402 S.W.2d 728 (Tex. 1966).
3. Orrell, 695 S.W.2d at 552; Boren, 402 S.W.2d at 729.
4. See Shriners Hosp. for Crippled Children v. Stahl, 610 S.W.2d 147, 151 (Tex. 1980);
Haile v. Holtzclaw, 414 S.W.2d 916, 922 (Tex. 1967); Briggs v. Peebles, 144 Tex. 47, 52, 188
S.W.2d 147, 150 (1945).
5. See Ward v. First-Wichita Nat'l Bank, 387 S.W.2d 913, 915 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort
Worth 1965, writ ref'd n.r.e); McGrew v. Bartlett, 387 S.W.2d 702, 703 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Houston 1965, writ ref'd); Lawson v. Dawson's Estate, 53 S.W. 64, 65 (Tex. Civ. App-1899,
writ ref'd).
6. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 59 (Vernon 1980).
7. Section 59 allows the execution of a self-proving affidavit even years after the execu-
tion of the will. Id.
8. 695 S.W.2d at 552.
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reaffirmed the Boren rule, the majority overruled the trial court, the appel-
late court, and three dissenting justices, who sought to avoid the
technicality. 9
In another case involving validity of execution under section 59,
Muhlbauer v. Muhlbauer, 0 the appellate court pondered the issue of a testa-
tor's receiving physical assistance from another person when executing his
will. In a lawyer's office the wife of the blind and crippled testator guided
his hand to sign a new will, in which the testator made his wife the sole
beneficiary. The court affirmed the trial court's summary judgment denying
probate, on the grounds that the testator had not specifically requested his
wife to guide his hand and that the wife therefore did not execute the will at
the testator's direction."I The court apparently also considered significant
the fact that the testator, although physically capable, had not attempted to
make a mark prior to the physical assistance. 12 Another person, however,
may validly execute a will at the testator's request and on the testator's be-
half without the testator's making any mark.13
Revocation. Presumed revocation of a will missing by destruction was at
issue in McNamara v. Hall. 14 In that case a testator, who had poor eyesight,
made two copies of his will, placed one copy in an envelope marked "Will,"
mailed one copy to the proponent, and apparently mailed the original to the
contestant, who did not testify. Because the will was not last seen in the
possession of the testator, the testator having mailed the will to the contest-
ant, the proponent's failure to produce the original did not raise the pre-
sumption that the testator destroyed the will with the intent to revoke it. '5
Although the contestant did not testify, the appellate court held that circum-
stantial evidence proved that the will was last in the possession of the con-
testant.16 Another appellate court reached a similar result in In re Estate of
Caples. 17 In that case the appellate court reversed the trial court's instructed
verdict denying probate of a copy of a lost will. 18 The appellate court held
that evidence that the contestant may have surreptitiously removed the will
from the possession of the testator sufficiently rebutted the presumption of
9. Id. A lawyer did not prepare the will in question, which was a printed form. Various
witnesses testified that the testator had intended to sign the will but, by mistake, signed the
self-proving affidavit. The majority deemed these facts irrelevant. Id.
10. 686 S.W.2d 366 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1985, no writ),
11. Id. at 377. The relevant portion of § 59 is as follows: "Every last will and testament,
except where otherwise provided by law, shall be in writing and signed by the testator in
person or by another person for him by his direction and in his presence. TEX. PROB.
CODE ANN. § 59 (Vernon 1980).
12. 686 S.W.2d at 377.
13. See Trezevant v. Rains, 19 S.W. 567, 568 (Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston), rev'd on other
grounds, 85 Tex. 329, 23 S.W. 890 (1892).
14. 678 S.W.2d 578 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1984, no writ).
15. Id. at 580. For the presumption of revocation of missing wills, see Berry v. Griffin,
531 S.W.2d 394, 395 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1975, writ rerd n.r.e.); Mingo v.
Mingo, 507 S.W.2d 310, 311 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1974, writ refd n.r.e.).
16. 678 S.W.2d at 580.
17. 683 S.W.2d 741 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1984, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
18. Id. at 742.
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revocation so as to require submission to the jury. 19
Contract to Make a Will. In Taylor v. Johnson2 0 an appellate court clarified
the rather brief provisions of Probate Code section 59A(a). 2 1 In that case a
nephew sued his aunt for anticipatory breach of an oral contract to make a
will. The court reiterated the requirement of section 59A(a) that the exe-
cuted will must describe the contract to make a will. 22 The court held that
evidence of an oral contract or of contractual wording in an unexecuted will
was immaterial. 23 Moreover, the court stated that a court should not limit
the scope of section 59A to probate proceedings. 24
The parties to the oral contract to make a will in Leigh v. Weiner25 made
the contract prior to the effective date of section 59A(a). 26 The court there-
fore imposed a constructive trust on certain assets the testatrix devised in
violation of the contract with her deceased husband. 27 The husband, prior
to his death in 1952, conveyed the assets to his wife based on her agreement
to devise and bequeath the assets at her death to his children from a prior
marriage. Although the widow executed a will in 1953 providing for the
agreed disposition, she revoked that will in 1978 and signed a new will disin-
heriting the stepchildren. 28 The court held that the oral agreement estab-
lishing the constructive trust was not subject to the statute of wills, the
statute of frauds, or the Texas Trust Act.29 The court further held that limi-
tations did not bar the suit since the contestant filed the suit within four
years after the widow's death. 30
Jurisdiction. The supreme court in Hilburn v. Jennings3 1 held that will con-
testants, by filing a contest to the will, waived any jurisdictional complaint
regarding lack of notice of the proponent's application to probate a will. 32
The court reversed the appellate court and affirmed the trial court's probate
19. Id. at 743.
20. 677 S.W.2d 680 (Tex. App.-Eastland 1984, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
21. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 59A(a) (Vernon 1980) provides:
A contract to make a will or devise, or not to revoke a will or devise, if executed
or entered into on or after September 1, 1979, can be established only by provi-
sions of a will stating that a contract does exist and stating the material provi-
sions of the contract.
22. 677 S.W.2d at 682.
23. Id.
24. Id. Note that § 59A(a) is in effect a supplement to the statute of frauds, TEX. Bus. &
COM. CODE ANN. § 26.01 (Vernon 1968).
25. 679 S.W.2d 46 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1984, no writ).
26. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 59A(a) (Vernon 1980) only applies to wills executed after
Sept. 1, 1979.
27. 679 S.W.2d at 49.
28. The widow died five weeks later at the age of ninety-five. Id. at 47.
29. Id. at 48; see Pope v. Garrett, 147 Tex. 18, 21, 211 S.W.2d 559, 561 (1948); Ginther v.
Taub, 570 S.W.2d 516, 525 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1978, writ ref'd n.r.e.). Whether this
general rule permits a court to impose a constructive trust despite § 59A, however, remains
unclear.
30. 679 S.W.2d at 48-49.
31. 698 S.W.2d 99 (Tex. 1985).
32. Id. at 100.,
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of the will. 33 The supreme court did not discuss the questionable additional
holding of the appellate court that the four-year statute of limitations in Pro-
bate Code section 73(a)34 barred probate of the will as a result of the propo-
nent's failure to arrange timely posted notice of his application. 35 Arguably,
however, the filing of the will contest within four years after the testator's
death tolled the statute of limitations, and the posting of notice after the
limitations period was immaterial.
Will Contests. Minutes before committing suicide, the testator in Bauer v.
Estate of Bauer36 wrote a holographic will leaving his estate to his girlfriend
and stating that his reason for committing suicide was a lack of family love.
The testator's mother contested, alleging lack of testamentary capacity by
reason of an insane delusion concerning the family. Citing the Lindley v.
Lindley37 definition of insane delusion as "the belief of a state of supposed
facts that do not exist, and which no rational person would believe,"'38 the
appellate court held immaterial all evidence concerning the testator's beliefs
about family love, because the jury could not judge such beliefs by objective
specific facts.39 The court reiterated the general rule that evidence of an
insane delusion is relevant only if the evidence directly affects the terms of
the will. 40
In Green v. Green4' the appellate court reversed the trial court's judgment
n.o.v. denying the jury's finding of undue influence.42 Following Rothermel
v. Duncan,43 the court distinguished the concepts of testamentary capacity
and undue influence. 44 Testamentary capacity tests the existence of intelli-
gent mental power.45 Undue influence admits the existence of testamentary
capacity, but tests another person's control of such capacity. 46 The court
based the reversal upon circumstantial evidence that a person exerted influ-
ence to overpower the mind of the testator and obtain execution of the prof-
fered will. 47
A testatrix's naming of her attorney as a beneficiary under her will does
33. Id. The reversal effectively overruled similar appellate holdings in Mitchell v. Rutter,
221 S.W.2d 979, 981 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1949, no writ), and Green v. White, 32 S.W.2d
488, 490 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1930, no writ).
34. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 73(a) (Vernon 1980).
35. Jennings v. Hilburn, 690 S.W.2d 298, 300 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1985).
36. 687 S.W.2d 410 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
37. 384 S.W.2d 676 (Tex. 1984).
38. Id. at 679.
39. 687 S.W.2d at 413. The court believed that the concept of family love was too subjec-
tive for legal proof. Id.
40. Id. at 411; see Rich v. Rich, 615 S.W.2d 795, 797 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st
Dist.] 1980, no writ); Gulf Oil Corp. v. Walker, 288 S.W.2d 173, 180-81 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Beaumont 1956, no writ).
41. 679 S.W.2d 640 (Tex. App.-Houston (1st Dist.] 1984, no writ).
42. Id. at 644.
43. 369 S.W.2d 917 (Tex. 1963).
44. 679 S.W.2d at 643-44.





not, according to the court in Dailey v. Wheat,48 raise a presumption that the
attorney exerted undue influence. 49 The court cited the general rule that a
person may dispose of his estate to any person that he chooses, and refused
to shift the burden of proof concerning undue influence from the contestant
to the proponent-attorney.50 The fact that the proponent-attorney super-
vised the drafting and the execution of the will apparently was not signifi-
cant. The court further denied the contestant's allegation that Probate Code
section 551 was unconstitutional because in a less populated county the jury
would have consisted of twelve jurors instead of six.5 2 The court held that a
rational basis for the geographical distinction existed. 53
In Estate of Murphy54 the executor named in a 1959 will contested a 1979
will on the grounds that the co-executors named in the latter will procured it
through undue influence, and that the contractual nature of the 1959 will
barred any later wills. After a discussion of the concept of undue influence,
the factors a court should consider, and the use of circumstantial evidence,
the court held that no evidence supported a finding of undue influence over
the ninety-nine-year-old testatrix.55 The court apparently found significant
the fact that the 1979 will was virtually identical to the 1959 will, except for
the choice of executor. 56 The court also overruled the contestant's claim
that the 1979 will was contractually barred, citing the rule that a court must
probate a valid subsequent will that revokes a joint will regardless of any
contractual intent.57 The court remanded the case on two grounds. First,
the court remanded to determine whether the 1959 will was in fact contrac-
tual.58 Second, the court remanded to determine whether an intervening
1974 will, which the testatrix executed prior to the death of the other con-
tracting party, effectively revoked the 1959 contract. 59 When neither an en-
forceable contract to the contrary nor fraud exist, either party to a
48. 681 S.W.2d 747 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1984, writ ref d n.r.e.).
49. Id. at 755.
50. Id.; accord In re Estate of Willenbrock, 603 S.W.2d 348, 351 (Tex. Civ. App.-East-
land 1980, writ ref d n.r.e.); Lipper v. Weslow, 369 S.W.2d 698, 703 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco
1963, writ refd n.r.e.); Krahl v. Lehmann, 277 S.W.2d 792, 795-96 (Tex. Civ. App.-San
Antonio), rev'd on other grounds, 155 Tex. 270, 285 S.W.2d 179 (1955); Naihaus v. Feigon, 244
S.W.2d 325, 329 (Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston 1951, writ refd n.r.e.); In re Burns' Estate, 52
S.W. 98, 100 (Tex. Civ. App. 1899, writ ref d). Contra Spillman v. Estate of Spillman, 587
S.W.2d 170, 172 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1979, writ refd n.r.e.).
51. TEX. PROS. CODE ANN. § 5 (Vernon 1980).
52. 681 S.W.2d at 758.
53. Id. In a statutory probate court or county court, TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 5
(Vernon Supp. 1986) limits the contestant to six jurors; on the same matter in a district court
the contestant would receive twelve jurors.
54. 694 S.W.2d 10 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1985, writ ref d n.r.e.).
55. Id. at 15.
56. Id. A requisite element of undue influence is a disposition in the contested will that
the testratrix would not have made but for the undue influence. See Rothermel v. Duncan, 369
S.W.2d 917, 922 (Tex. 1983); Boyer v. Pool, 154 Tex. 586, 587, 280 S.W.2d 564, 565 (1955).
57. 694 S.W.2d at 16; see Tips v. Yancey, 431 S.W.2d 763, 765 (Tex. 1968); Nesbett v.
Nesbett, 428 S.W.2d 663, 664 (Tex. 1968); Hunt v. Knolle, 551 S.W.2d 764, 766-67 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Tyler 1977, no writ).
58. 694 S.W.2d at 16.
59. Id. at 15.
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contractual will has a right to execute a new will without notice to the other
party when both parties are still alive and the other party is sui juris.60
As a possible sequel to Estate of Murphy, in Todd v. Cartwright6' the
court similarly considered three wills of the testatrix: a contractual 1977
will made with her husband, and 1978 and 1982 wills made subsequent to
her husband's death. The proponent of the contractual 1977 will contested
the 1982 will. After probating the 1982 will, the court proceeded to impose
a constructive trust over the estate for the benefit of the beneficiaries under
the contractual 1977 will. 62 Althougth the 1977 will contained no terms
specifically describing a contract, the court imputed a contract based on the
facts that the husband and wife's wills were virtually identical, the same
witnesses signed them, the same lawyer drafted them, and the couple exe-
cuted them within three months of each other.63 The court also found sig-
nificant the fact that the wills made provision for the stepchildren of both
spouses.64 The court apparently also considered oral testimony supporting
contractual intent.65
Family Settlement Agreement. In Gregory v. Rice66 the court reversed and
remanded due to an improper jury instruction. 67 The court, however, com-
mented favorably for appellee that circumstantial evidence supported the
trial court's finding of an oral settlement agreement, and that no specific
consideration was necessary. to make the family settlement agreement
valid.68 The court overruled appellant's statute of frauds challenge based on
Texas Business and Commerce Code section 8.319,69 which deals with se-
curities contracts. By failing to comment on any other requirement of writ-
ing, the court apparently held that an oral family settlement agreement may
be valid. Arguably, however, a family settlement agreement must be in writ-
ing to comply with the statute of frauds, especially if the agreement disposes
of real property.70
60. Id.; see Magids v. American Title Ins. Co., 473 S.W.2d 460, 464 (Tex. 1971); Freeman
v. Freeman, 569 S.W.2d 626, 629 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1978, no writ).
61. 684 S.W.2d 154 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1984, writ refd n.r.e).
62. Id. at 155.
63. Id. at 157. A will is not necessarily contractual, however, merely because it is exe-
cuted jointly and the terms are mutual and reciprocal. Bishop v. Scoggins, 589 S.W.2d 151,
155 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1979, writ refd n.r.e.); Crain v. Mitchell, 479 S.W.2d 956, 958
(Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1972, writ dism'd); Ellexson v. Ellexson, 467 S.W.2d 515, 520
(Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1971, no writ); Curtis v. Aycock, 179 S.W.2d 843, 847 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Waco 1944, writ refd w.o.m.).
64. 684 S.W.2d at 157. Courts have held mutual bequests to children of prior marriages
to be evidence of a contractual will. Trlica v. Bunch, 642 S.W.2d 540, 543 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Dallas 1982, no writ); Knolle v. Hunt, 551 S.W.2d 755, 760 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1977, writ
refd n.r.e.).
65. See 684 S.W.2d at 157-58.
66. 678 S.W.2d 603 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1984, writ refd n.r.e).
67. Id. at 606.
68. Id. at 607; see Wedengartner v. Reichert, 218 S.W.2d 304, 310 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Waco 1948, writ refd n.r.e.).
69. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 8.319 (Vernon 1968).
70. See TEX. R. Civ. P. I1 (requiring settlement agreements to be in writing). But see
Myers v. Thomas, 502 S.W.2d 941, 943 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1973, no writ).
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Will Construction. The testatrix's statement that a beneficiary "shall have
complete charge of my home" and "all contents" created a life estate accord-
ing to the court in Taliaferro v. Mayer.?1 The court reasoned that the right
to absolute custody, without the power to dispose of the property, indicated
a limited devise.7 2 Relying on the strong presumption in Texas against intes-
tacy, the court in Wilkins v. Garza73 held that a lapsed legacy passed
through the will's residuary clause and not by intestacy.7 4 The court effec-
tively held that a court presumes a lapsed legacy to pass to the beneficiary of
the residuary clause unless the testator expresses a contrary intention in the
will. 7" Although the residuary clause purported to dispose of those assets
not specifically mentioned, the court determined that the testatrix intended
to include the lapsed legacy in the residuary clause and to avoid intestacy
completely. 76
In a significant decision the supreme court ruled that the designation of an
agent in a will to broker real estate was merely precatory language, and not
binding on the estate. In Kelly v. Marlin77 the will provided that Marlin
should receive a six percent commission upon the testator's widow's sale of
any land devised to her under the will. The executor, with the widow's par-
ticipation, sold certain land of the estate for ten million dollars. The execu-
tor, however, paid a commission to the widow's son from a previous
marriage and refused to pay Marlin any commission. The trial court denied
Marlin's claim for commission, but the court of appeals reversed and ren-
dered for Marlin on the basis that he was a conditional beneficiary. 78 The
supreme court reversed the appellate court and denied the commission. 79
The supreme court reasoned that the testamentary provision did not contain
the traditional words of limitation on a fee simple estate,80 and that the pro-
vision would force the widow to perform a nondelegable duty. 8 1 After the
71. 681 S.W.2d 882 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1984, no writ).
72. Id. at 884-85; see Lawrence v. Lawrence, 229 S.W.2d 219, 222 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort
Worth 1950, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
73. 693 S.W.2d 553 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1985, no writ).
74. Id. at 556.
75. See Shriners Hosp. For Crippled Children v. Stahl, 610 S.W.2d 147, 152 (Tex. 1980);
Kuehn v. Bremer, 132 S.W.2d 295, 297-98 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1939, writ refd).
76. 693 S.W.2d at 556. When a will contains a residuary clause, a strong presumption
exists against intentional as well as unintentional intestacy. Morris v. Finkelstein, 442 S.W.2d
452, 455 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1969, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Goggans v. Simmons,
319 S.W.2d 442, 445 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1958, writ refd n.r.e.).
77. 28 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 410 (May 8, 1985). This decision has not yet been released for
official publication.
78. Marlin v. Kelly, 678 S.W.2d 582, 588 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1984).
79. Kelly v. Marlin, 28 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 410, 410 (May 8, 1985).
80. By contrast, note that a will requiring a devisee to pay a fixed sum of money to an-
other person creates an enforceable charge on the devised land. Rubio v. Valdez, 603 S.W.2d
346, 347-48 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1980, writ refd n.r.e.); Conway v. Estes, 346 S.W.2d
374, 375 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1961, no writ).
81. 28 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 411. The court specified three classes of duties as being nondele-
gable: (1) duties that call for the personal services of the original obligor; (2) duties premised
on the artistic skill or unique abilities of a party, such as a contract to paint a picture; and (3)
duties that involve a close personal relationship, such as duties owed by an attorney to his
client, a physician to his patient, or a broker to his principal. Id. at 412.
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court determined that the commission was not a devise, the court character-
ized the provision as an attempt to force the widow into a fiduciary relation-
ship with Marlin through acceptance of her devise.82 The court held that
contract law protects parties from being forced into personal service con-
tracts and fiduciary relationships without the parties' mutual consent.8 3 The
court noted that a testamentary designation of an attorney to represent an
estate is also precatory language.84
Despite the Texas presumption against intestacy,8 5 the court in Kaufhold
v. McIver 6 construed an unambiguous will as making no provision for the
disposition of real property of the testatrix.87 Apparently the testatrix mis-
takenly left out the residuary clause in her will and provided only for specific
bequests of personal effects and devise of her homestead. Given evidence
that the testatrix was well-aware that real property was distinct from per-
sonal property, the court held that her bequest of personal effects only dis-
posed of her personal property.88 The unmentioned real property therefore
passed by intestacy.8 9 When construing the will the court held that the tes-
tatrix's mistake of failing to include a residuary clause was immaterial. 90
The presence of ambiguity in a will, however, as demonstrated in Howard
v. McCulley,91 allows the examining court to construe the will so as to avoid
intestacy. Although the trial court rendered a summary judgment denying
probate because of unfulfilled contingencies in the will, the Dallas appellate
court seized on a relatively weak ambiguity and allowed probate. 92 The ap-
pellate court cited the general rule that if the will is open to two construc-
tions the court should interpret the will in such a way as to prevent
intestacy.93 The court held that certain ambiguous contingencies were met
so as to activate the testate disposition. 94
The Dallas appellate court faced a strikingly similar situation in Nash v.
Corpus Christi National Bank.95 In that case the appellant challenged a
summary judgment of intestacy under a contingent will. The Nash will,
however, did not contain any of the ambiguity present in the Howard will,
82. Id.
83. Id. at 412; see Allen v. Camp, 101 Tex. 260, 260, 106 S.W. 315, 315 (1908); Moran v.
Wotola Royalty Corp., 123 S.W.2d 692, 694 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1938, writ ref d).
84. 28 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 411.
85. See Shriners Hosp. for Crippled Children v. Stahl, 610 S.W.2d 147, 151 (Tex. 1980);
Haile v. Holtzclaw, 414 S.W.2d 916, 922 (Tex. 1967); Briggs v. Peebles, 144 Tex. 47, 52, 188
S.W.2d 147, 150 (1945).
86. 682 S.W.2d 660 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1984, writ ref'd n.r.e.)
87. Id. at 666.
88. Id. at 665.
89. Id. at 666.
90. Id. at 667; see Haile v. Holtzclaw, 414 S.W.2d 916, 922 (Tex. 1967); Carr v. Rogers,
383 S.W.2d 383, 385 (Tex. 1964); Selder v. Stewart, 461 S.W.2d 239, 244 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Dallas 1970), afid, 473 S.W.2d 3 (Tex. 1971).
91. 686 S.W.2d 650 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1985, writ ref d n.r.e.).
92. Id. at 652.
93. Id.; see Ferguson v. Ferguson, 121 Tex. 119, 122, 45 S.W.2d 1096, 1097 (1931).
94. 686 S.W.2d at 652; for a good discussion of contingent wills, see Bagnall v. Bagnall,
148 Tex. 423, 424-33, 225 S.W.2d 401, 401-07 (1949).
95. 692 S.W.2d 117 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1985, writ refd n.r.e.).
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and the court therefore affirmed the trial court's ruling of intestacy. 96 The
testator in Nash provided a disposition only in the event of the simultaneous
death of his wife. The appellate court rejected the appellant's allegation that
simultaneous death had occurred due to the fact that the wife was dead at
the time of the testator's death.97 The court held that the contingency neces-
sary to validate the will had not occurred. 98
An appellate court also construed a simultaneous death contingency in
Formby v. Bradley.99 In that case the appellant unsuccessfully, albeit cre-
atively, alleged that simultaneous death had occurred due to the divorced
status of the testator and his former wife at the time of the testator's death.
Although Probate Code section 69(b)100 provides that a court should not
consider a person who is divorced from the decedent to be a surviving
spouse, the court reasoned that a divorce that occurred five years before the
testator's death was not simultaneous with his death.' 0' Since simultaneous
death of the testator and his former wife had not occurred, the contingent
alternate provisions in the will were inapplicable, rendering the designation
of executor useless.' 0 2 The surviving wife of the testator accordingly sought
to exercise her preferential right to have the court appoint her administratrix
under Probate Code section 77.103 Both the trial court and the appellate
court disqualified the surviving wife, however, due to conflicts of interest
between herself and the heirs, conflicts that arose largely from her effort to
characterize certain assets as community property over the heirs'
objections. 104
In two very similar cases, the supreme court reversed the Fort Worth and
San Antonio appellate courts and held that certain joint wills were contrac-
tual. In Odeneal v. Van Horn'0 5 and Wiemers v. Wiemers'0 6 the surviving
spouses had probated the joint wills in question upon the death of the first
spouse. Subsequently, the surviving spouse or the surviving spouse's benefi-
ciaries filed declaratory judgment actions to free them from any binding ef-
fect of the probated wills. The supreme court held that the joint wills were
contractual on their faces because both spouses executed the wills and the
wills set forth a reciprocal, mirror-image plan to dispose of all of their com-
bined estate.'0 7 Since both couples executed their wills before September 1,
96. Id. at 119.
97. Id.
98. Id. For a similar ruling, see Smith v. Williams, 449 S.W.2d 359, 361 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Beaumont 1969, writ refd n.r.e.).
99. 695 S.W.2d 782 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1985, writ requested).
100. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 69(b) (Vernon 1980) provides: "A person who is divorced
from the decedent or whose marriage to the decedent has been annulled is not a surviving
spouse unless, by virtue of a subsequent marriage, the person is married to the decedent at the
time of death."
101. 695 S.W.2d at 784. The court indicated, however, that the court would equate divorce
with prior death of the testator's wife if prior death had been a contingency in the will. Id.
102. Id.
103. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 77 (Vernon 1980).
104. 695 S.W.2d at 785.
105. 678 S.W.2d 941 (Tex. 1984).
106. 683 S.W.2d 355 (Tex. 1984).
107. Odeneal, 678 S.W.2d at 942; Wiemers, 683 S.W.2d at 356-57.
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1979, the requirement of Probate Code section 59A'0 8 that the wills specifi-
cally state the existence of a contract did not apply.' 0 9
Although the parties apparently did not raise the issue, the Odeneal will
disposed of all property that the survivor owned upon his or her death. 0
The full legal and practical impact of such an attempt to dispose of property
acquired by one spouse after the other spouse's death is unclear. Probate of
a joint and contractual will, however, effectively renders the surviving spouse
incapable of writing a new will."' Furthermore, a new spouse apparently
would have no interest whatsoever in either the community or the separate
property of the surviving spouse," t2 other than a homestead interest." t
3
In Traylor v. Unitedbank Orange" 14 a statute of limitations and principles
of estoppel barred trust beneficiaries from invalidating a testamentary trust
for any violation of the rule against perpetuities. 15 The court held that the
beneficiaries' attempt to invalidate the trust was in effect a will contest, and
that the statute of limitations governing will contests barred the suit. 16 In
addition, the court held that acceptance of trust benefits estopped the benefi-
ciaries from challenging the trust." 17
II. NONTESTAMENTARY TRANSFERS
Despite the permissive provisions of Probate Code section 46(b),1 8 the
court in Jameson v. Bain"19 reaffirmed the pre-section 46(b) rule of Maples v.
Nimitz 20 that a partition of community funds, in order to be valid, must
occur separately and prior to the creation of a joint tenancy with right of
108. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 59A (Vernon 1980).
109. One should keep in mind that, although the supreme court concluded that disposition
and mutuality of the wills demonstrated sufficient evidence of contractual intent, § 59A(b)
specifies that the mere execution of a joint will containing contractual wording is no longer
sufficient to prove a contract. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 59A(b) (Vernon 1980) provides:
"The execution of a joint will or reciprocal wills does not by itself suffice as evidence of the
existence of a contract."
110. 678 S.W.2d at 942.
111. Magids v. American Title Ins. Co., 459 S.W.2d 238, 244 (Tex. 1970).
112. See Perl v. Howell, 650 S.W.2d 523, 525 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1983, writ ref'd n.r.e.);
Wallace v. Turriff, 531 S.W.2d 692, 695 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
113. See Vermillion v. Haynes, 147 Tex. 359, 363, 215 S.W.2d 605, 608 (1949); Greene v.
White, 137 Tex. 361, 385, 153 S.W.2d 575, 588 (1941).
114. 675 S.W.2d 802 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1984, writ refd n.r.e.).
115. Id. at 805.
116. Id. Act of Aug. 9, 1876, ch. 84, § 3, 1876 Tex. Gen. Laws 94, 8 H. GAMMEL, LAWS
OF TEXAS 930-31 (1898), repealed by Act of June 16, 1985, ch. 959, § 1, 1985 Tex. Sess. Law
Serv. 7043, 7065 (Vernon), provided a four-year limitations period for contest of a will pro-
bated prior to Dec. 31, 1955.
117. 675 S.W.2d at 805; see Trevino v. Turcotte, 564 S.W.2d 682, 685-86 (Tex. 1978).
118. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 46(b) (Vernon Supp. 1986) provides:
A written agreement between spouses and a bank, savings and loan, credit
union, or other financial institution may provide that existing funds or securities
on deposit and funds and securities to be deposited in the future and interest and
income thereon shall by that agreement be partitioned into separate property
and may further provide that the property partitioned by that agreement be held
in joint tenancies and pass by right of survivorship.
119. 693 S.W.2d 676 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1985, no writ).
120. 615 S.W.2d 690, 695 (Tex. 1981).
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survivorship.121 Although section 46(b) arguably permits a one-step parti-
tion whereby a signature card or other account agreement may simultane-
ously create a partition and a joint tenancy with right of survivorship, 122 the
court in Jameson insisted that the partition must come first. 123 For the sim-
ple reason that the parties signed the partition agreement on one side of the
signature card after they had signed the side that established the survivor-
ship account, the court held the partition invalid and therefore ineffective to
activate the survivorship provision. 124
In sharp contrast, however, the court also held that partition was unneces-
sary to pass community funds to a surviving spouse if the spouses placed the
funds in a revocable trust account with a spouse as trustee and the surviving
spouse as beneficiary.' 25 Strangely, the court relied on section 439(c) 12 6 to
distinguish survivorship rights in joint accounts from trust accounts.127 Sec-
tion 439(c), however, imposes no significantly greater burden for establishing
survivorship rights in a joint account than in a trust account. 128 Any re-
quirements for valid partition should arguably apply equally to a joint ac-
count and a trust account. As the parties did not carry the case to the
supreme court, however, this curious dichotomy remains unchallenged.
The lack of an executed signature card in Magee v. Westmoreland 129 pre-
vented the establishment of a right of survivorship to a certificate of deposit
payable jointly to the decedent and the claimant, even though the funds used
to acquire the certificate of deposit indirectly came from a checking account
that did provide for survivorship rights.130 The court emphasized the abso-
lute requirements of Probate Code sections 46(a)' 3 ' and 439(a)' 32 of a signed
written agreement for creation of survivorship rights.' 33
According to the court in Chopin v. InterFirst Bank Dallas134, however,
not even an executed signature card providing for payment at the depositor's
death to a survivor can establish survivorship rights if the card fails to spec-
ify ownership in the survivor. 135 The court held that instructions on the
signature card to pay the funds to the survivor did not vest ownership in the
survivor. 136 The key factor to the court was the absence of words describing
121. 693 S.W.2d at 678-79.
122. McKnight, Family Law.- Husband and Wife, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 36 Sw.
L.J. 97, 105 (1982).
123. 693 S.W.2d at 678-79.
124. Id. at 679.
125. Id. at 680.
126. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 439(c) (Vernon 1980).
127. 693 S.W.2d at 680-81.
128. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 439(c) (Vernon 1980).
129. 693 S.W.2d 612 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1985, writ refid n.r.e.).
130. Id. at 616.
131. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 46(a) (Vernon Supp. 1986).
132. Id. § 439(a) (Vernon 1980).
133. 693 S.W.2d at 615-16.
134. 694 S.W.2d 79 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1985, writ refd n.r.e.).
135. Id. at 84.
136. Id. The signature card signed by both depositors read as follows: "If there be more
than one depositor upon the endorsement of any depositor the bank is hereby authorized to
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a joint tenancy or a right of survivorship. 137 The court further held that the
mere creation of a joint account was not evidence of a depositor's inter vivos
gift to the survivor. 138
III. ESTATE ADMINISTRATION
Jurisdiction. A definitive delineation of probate court jurisdiction continues
to elude Texas courts. In a fascinating about-face in Texas jurisprudence,
the Texas legislature's one-sentence addition to Probate Code section
5A(b) 13 9 partially overruled the Texas Supreme Court's resounding, unani-
mous opinion in Seay v. Hall.140 Justice Kilgarlin, in his thorough opinion
in Seay v. Hall, analyzed the legislative history of the sixty-third through the
sixty-sixth legislative sessions and pertinent legal commentaries to reach a
conclusion that Probate Code section 5A14 1 confined probate court jurisdic-
tion to matters in which the controlling issue was the settlement, partition,
or distribution of an estate. 142 Since survival and wrongful death actions do
not directly relate to the traditional settlement, partition, or distribution of
an estate, Justice Kilgarlin reasoned that the legislature did not intend statu-
tory probate courts to have any jurisdiction over survival and wrongful
death actions.143 Justice Kilgarlin concluded that the proper forum for sur-
vival and wrongful death actions, "[a]bsent the legislature's express man-
date," was in state district courts. 14 4
Responding promptly to this cue, the sixty-ninth legislature tacked onto
section 5A(b) a single, innocuous-sounding sentence: "In actions by or
against a personal representative, the statutory probate courts have concur-
rent jurisdiction with the district courts."' 14 5 The legislature apparently in-
tended to rectify a part of the law set forth in Seay. The addition, however,
only increases the jurisdictional confusion.
The focus of the supreme court in Seay was whether survival and wrong-
pay to either of them or upon the death of one to the survivor the funds represented by this
certificate." Id.
137. Id. Contra William Marsh Rice Univ. v. Birdwell, 624 S.W.2d 661, 663 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1981, no writ).
138. 694 S.W.2d at 84; see Kennedy v. Beasley, 606 S.W.2d 1, 3 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston
[1st Dist.] 1980, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
139. Act of June 15, 1985, ch. 875, § 1, 1985 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 6429, 6429 (Vernon).
140. 677 S.W.2d 19 (Tex. 1984).
141. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 5A (Vernon 1980).
142. 677 S.W.2d at 21-23; accord Wolford v. Wolford, 590 S.W.2d 769, 771 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1979, writ ref d n.r.e.); Bell v. Hinkle, 562 S.W.2d 35, 37-38 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1978, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Sumaruk v. Todd, 560 S.W.2d 141,
144 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1977, no writ).
143. 677 S.W.2d at 25. Piper Aircraft Corp. v. Yowell, 674 S.W.2d 447 (Tex. App.-Fort
Worth 1984, writ granted), contrasts an action for wrongful death and a survival action as
follows: TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 4671 (Vernon 1940) confers a wrongful death action
upon the surviving husband, wife, child, and parents of a decedent; a survival action, however,
is a common law action for damages that the decedent and his estate sustain as a result of the
defendant's actions. 674 S.W.2d at 454.
144. 677 S.W.2d at 25.
145. Act of June 15, 1985, ch. 875, § 1, 1985 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 6429, 6430 (Vernon)
(codified at TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 5A(b) (Vernon Supp. 1986)).
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ful death actions were incident to an estate,' 4 6 because a statutory probate
court has jurisdiction only of matters incident to an estate. 147 In light of
Seay courts can use two approaches to analyze the addition to section 5A(b).
The simplest and clearest approach is to view the addition only as an altera-
tion of the result in Seay without changing the normal incident to an estate
analysis. Under this approach the legislature merely wished to allow parties
to bring certain suits not traditionally incident to an estate, such as survival
actions, in statutory probate court. Although wrongful death actions are not
intrinsically actions by or against personal representatives, the death of a
plaintiff or a defendant prior to the filing of the wrongful death action would
automatically make the suit by or against a personal representative. Courts
could determine statutory probate court jurisdiction based either on the "in-
cident to an estate" test or on a new "action by or against a personal repre-
sentative" test.' 48 The addition was thus a simple and direct response to
Justice Kilgarlin's cue, because the addition's only effect was to allow statu-
tory probate courts the possibility of hearing actions by or against personal
representatives. The problem with this approach, however, is the blunt fact
that the legislature placed the addition in section 5A, which deals with the
definition of matters incident to an estate, instead of in section 5, which deals
with the basic jurisdiction of the various courts. Logically, the reason that
the legislature placed the addition in section 5A was to avoid the creation of
a new jurisdictional test as suggested in this first approach.
The broad second approach is to view the addition, not just as an altera-
tion of the result in Seay, but as an alteration of the definition of matters
incident to an estate. This approach expands the Seay jurisdictional analy-
sis, but does not create another one. The problem with this approach is that
not only would the legislature have opened the statutory probate court doors
to all actions by or against personal representatives, but the legislature
would also have taken the radical step of potentially placing such actions
within the exclusive jurisdiction of statutory probate courts. Taken in con-
junction with the preceding sentence in section 5A(b), 149 which provides
that "[i]n situations where the jurisdiction of a statutory probate court is
concurrent with that of a district court, any cause of action appertaining to
estates or incident to an estate shall be brought in a statutory probate court
rather than in a district court," the addition may conceivably mean that, in
counties with statutory probate courts, parties must bring any action what-
soever, by or against a personal representative, exclusively in a statutory
court rather than in a district court. Thus, although the literal intent of the
addition was simply to overrule Seay and allow permissive filing of actions
by or against personal representatives in statutory probate court, construc-
tion of the addition in light of the total context of section 5A may transform
what was nonjurisdiction in Seay into exclusive jurisdiction. Such a broad
146. 677 S.W.2d at 23.
147. Id. at 24.
148. Obviously the two tests would overlap.
149. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 5A(b) (Vernon Supp. 1986).
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construction would cause great confusion among Texas lawyers in a myriad
of areas, including forcible entry and detainer, eminent domain, personal
injury, and other matters ordinarily heard outside of probate court. The
authors prefer the first approach because that approach narrowly construes
the intent and effect of the addition and avoids the potential uproar of the
second approach. '50
The addition to section 5A(b) increases the confusion already surrounding
construction of the sentence immediately preceding the addition. Numerous
courts have held that this sentence bestows exclusive jurisdiction in the stat-
utory probate court to hear matters incident to an estate, and that a district
court may not hear such matters.' 5 1 The court in First State Bank v.
Bishop,152 however, construed this sentence to allow concurrent jurisdiction
in the statutory probate court and the district court to hear matters incident
to an estate. 153 The statutory probate court therefore did not have exclusive
jurisdiction of matters incident to an estate, but only dominant jurisdic-
tion. 154 One could bring suit on rejected claims against an administrator in
either district court or the statutory probate court, because sections 313155
and 5A(b), construed together, clearly established concurrent jurisdiction in
those two courts. 156 The court emphasized, however, that by a plea in
abatement any party could have a suit dealing with matters incident to an
estate transferred from district court to the statutory probate court.157 The
court thus held that jurisdiction remained with the district court unless and
until a party's plea in abatement challenged jurisdiction. 158 Although the
case turned upon waiver of procedural defects, the impact of the case lies in
the court's finding of concurrent jurisdiction.
Clearly, the sentence could not logically refer to situations involving con-
150. Subsequent to the Survey period, through dictum in the footnote of a withdrawn opin-
ion, Yowell v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 29 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 164, 166 (Jan. 22, 1986), withdrawn, 29
Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 188 (Feb. 5, 1986), the supreme court indicated that the addition did not vest
the statutory probate court with exclusive jurisdiction of all actions by or against a personal
representative, but only established concurrent jurisdiction with the district court. The court
withdrew the opinion upon motion of all parties.
151. Piper Aircraft Corp. v. Yowell, 674 S.W.2d 447, 456 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1984,
writ granted); Seay v. Hall, 663 S.W. 2d 468, 472 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1983), afd in part and
rev'd in part on other grounds, 677 S.W.2d 19 (Tex. 1984); Adams v. Calloway, 662 S.W.2d
423, 426 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1983, no writ); Boman v. Howell, 618 S.W.2d 913, 916
(Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1981, no writ); Thomas v. Tollon, 609 S.W.2d 859, 861 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1980, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
152. 685 S.W.2d 732 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1985, writ rerd n.r.e.).
153. Id. at 736.
154. Id.
155. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 313 (Vernon 1980).
156. 685 S.W.2d at 736.
157. Id. For a discussion of dominant/concurrent jurisdiction, see Curtis v. Gibbs, 511
S.W.2d 263, 267 (Tex. 1974).
158. 685 S.W.2d at 736; see also Pullen v. Swanson, 667 S.W.2d 359, 364 (Tex. App.-
Houston [14th Dist.] 1984, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (§ 5A(b) did not divest district court of jurisdic-
tion to hear matters incident to estate even though an estate hearing was pending in statutory
probate court); 17 M. WOODWARD & E. SMITH, PROBATE AND DECEDENTS' ESTATES § 10,
at 17-18 (Texas Practice Supp. 1985) (§ 5A(b) directs parties to bring certain actions in statu-
tory probate court rather than district court, although this direction does not expressly deprive
district courts of jurisdiction).
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current jurisdiction if the statutory probate court in reality had exclusive
jurisdiction and the district court had no jurisdiction. Although numerous
cases 159 contradict First State Bank, the supreme court's refusal of a writ for
this case is some indication of approval. Furthermore, the supreme court's
reference in Seay to dominant jurisdiction 160 implies a determination against
exclusive jurisdiction of statutory probate courts.
Similarly, the court in Smith v. Smith 16 1 held that contestants can origi-
nally file contested probate matters in district court even though the estate is
pending in a constitutional county court. 162 The court noted that Texas
Probate Code section 5(b) 163 controlled the district court's jurisdiction. 164
Although section 5(b) provides for transfer to district court, the section does
not mention original filing in district court. Nevertheless, the court in Smith
effectively held that transfer from a county court was not a prerequisite to
jurisdiction in the district court.' 65 Apparently, the court felt that, if a con-
tested probate matter can be transferred to district court, it can be filed there
in the first place.
Once a constitutional county court has transferred administration to a dis-
trict court under section 5(b), according to the court in Weldon v. Hill' 66 the
district court has full jurisdiction to hear all matters incident to the estate,
including those matters not within the jurisdiction of the county court.' 67
Although section 145(h) 168 prohibits any further proceedings in the county
court after the probate and filing of an inventory, the court construed section
5(b) to provide that the district court upon transfer could hear the proceed-
ing as if the beneficiary had originally filed the contest in the district
court. 169 The court also held that section 145(h) does not apply to district
courts.' 7 0 Moreover, as in First State Bank, the court affirmed that the dis-
159. Piper Aircraft Corp. v. Yowell, 674 S.W.2d 447, 456 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1984,
writ granted); Seay v. Hall, 663 S.W.2d 468, 472 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1983), affd in part and
rev'd in part on other grounds, 677 S.W.2d 19 (Tex. 1984); Adams v. Calloway, 662 S.W.2d
423, 426 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1983, no writ); Boman v. Howell, 618 S.W.2d 913, 916
(Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1981, no writ); Thomas v. Tollon, 609 S.W.2d 859, 861 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1980, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
160. 677 S.W.2d at 21, 24.
161. 694 S.W.2d 426 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1985, writ refd n.r.e.).
162. Id. at 430.
163. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 5(b) (Vernon Supp. 1986).
164. 694 S.W.2d at 430.
165. See id. Illustrating the continual confusion over concurrent jurisdiction, the court
expressly overruled its contrary holding in Nichols v. Prejean, 673 S.W.2d 394, 396 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Tyler 1984, no writ). 694 S.W.2d at 430.
166. 678 S.W.2d 268 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1984, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
167. Id. at 275.
168. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 145(h) (Vernon 1980) provides:
When an independent administration has been created, and the order appointing
an independent executor has been entered by the county court, and the inven-
tory, appraisement, and list aforesaid has been filed by the executor and ap-
proved by the county court, as long as the estate is represented by an
independent executor, further action of any nature shall not be had in the
county court except where this Code specifically and explicitly provides for
some action in the county court.
169. 678 S.W.2d at 275.
170. Id. at 274.
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trict court had concurrent jurisdiction with the district court sitting in pro-
bate and that the failure of the appellant to file an effective plea in abatement
waived any challenge to jurisdiction. 17 1 Contrary to First State Bank, how-
ever, the court in Weldon declared that the transfer upon a plea in abatement
was not automatic; the court first had to determine that the proceedings
involved the same parties and the same controversy. 172 Since the declara-
tory judgment sought in Weldon was completely different from any relief
sought in the pending probate proceeding, transfer upon plea in abatement
was improper. 173 The court cited Curtis v. Gibbs174 for support, as did the
court in First State Bank, although that court held that transfer, upon objec-
tion, was automatic.' 75 The contradictory holdings are distinguishable,
however, in that First State Bank involved a statutory probate court and the
effect of section 5A(b), while Weldon involved a district court sitting in pro-
bate, where section 5A(b) was inapplicable.
Disqualification of Executor. In a case of first impression, the court in Smith
v. Christley176 construed Probate Code section 78(c) 177 to disqualify a con-
victed felon from serving as executor, even though he was in the process of
appealing the conviction. 178 The court reasoned that the position of in-
dependent executor was not subject to extensive court administration, and
that allowing a person convicted of a felony to serve as executor could ad-
versely affect third parties.' 79 The court also relied on section 149C(a)
(5),180 which allows removal of an independent executor if a court sentences
him to prison.
Claims. Although the Probate Code imposes no formal requirements for
presentment of claims to independent executors,' 8' and requires no particu-
lar form of presentment prior to suit on a claim, 182 all claims against an
independent administration ultimately will be subject to classification under
171. Id. at 278.
172. Id. at 277.
173. Id. at 278.
174. 511 S.W.2d 263, 267 (Tex. 1974).
175. 685 S.W.2d at 736.
176. 684 S.W.2d 158 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1984, writ refd n.r.e.).
177. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 78 (Vernon 1980) provides:
No person is qualified to serve as an executor or administrator who is: . . . (c) a
convicted felon, under the laws either of the United States or of any state of
territory of the United States, or of the District of Columbia, unless such person
has been duly pardoned, or his civil rights restored, in accordance with law
178. 684 S.W.2d at 160.
179. Id.
180. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 149C(a)(5) (Vernon 1980) allows the probate court to re-
move an independent executor when "he becomes incompetent, or is sentenced to the peniten-
tiary, or from any other cause becomes legally incapacitated from properly performing his
fiduciary duties."
181. See Bunting v. Pearson, 430 S.W.2d 470, 472 (Tex. 1968); State v. Traylor, 374
S.W.2d 203, 204-05 (Tex. 1963); 17 M. WOODWARD & E. SMITH, supra note 158, § 501, at
412-13 (Texas Practice 1971).




section 322.183 A criterion for designation of a class 4 claim 184 under section
322 is presentation to the representative within six months after his appoint-
ment. 185 In Alterman v. Frost National Bank' 86 a claimant sent a letter
within six months after the decedent's death to the independent executor
indicating the amounts claimed on notes signed by the decedent. Both par-
ties agreed that the letter, if a claim, was legally exhibited so as to fall within
class 4. The court resolved the key issue, whether the letter to the independ-
ent executor constituted a claim, in favor of the claimant.187 The court held
that the Probate Code required no particular form of claim against an in-
dependent executor, and that a simple itemization of debts sufficed as a claim
under section 322.188
In a split decision the supreme court in Hofer v. Lavender189 construed the
Texas survival statute' 90 and the Wrongful Death Act' 91 to allow the estate
of a decedent to obtain an award of exemplary damages against the estate of
a deceased tortfeasor. 192 The supreme court construed the Texas survival
statute broadly to allow the estate of the wronged decedent to recover exem-
plary damages for virtually any malicious injury' 93 from the wrongdoer's
estate. 194 Thus, under the Texas survival statute, the death of either plaintiff
or defendant apparently will not affect claims for exemplary damages.
Jury. The court in Maddox v. Surber'95 held that the Probate Code provides
no right to jury trial to determine probate venue.196 The general venue stat-
ute' 97 applies to all civil proceedings, including probate proceedings, in the
absence of a conflict with a specific statutory provision.198 The court deter-
mined that Probate Code section 21199 did not add to or conflict with the
183. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 322 (Vernon 1980); see Bunting v. Pearson, 430 S.W.2d
470, 473 (Tex. 1968).
184. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 322 (Vernon 1980) defines five classes of claims against an
estate. Class 4 claims are: "All other claims legally exhibited within six months after the
original grant of letters testamentary or of administration." Id.
185. Id.
186. 675 S.W.2d 619 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1984, no writ).
187. Id. at 622.
188. Id.
189. 679 S.W.2d 470 (Tex. 1984).
190. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 71.021 (Vernon Pam. Supp. 1986).
191. Id. §§ 71.001-.011.
192. 679 S.W.2d at 475.
193. Id.; accord Castleberry v. Goolsby Bldg. Corp., 617 S.W.2d 665, 666 (Tex. 1981);
Folsom Inv., Inc. v. Troutz, 632 S.W.2d 872, 877 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1982, writ refd
n.r.e.); Pace v. McEwen, 574 S.W.2d 792, 801 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1978, writ refd
n.r.e.); Houston-American Life Ins. Co. v. Tate, 358 S.W.2d 645, 649 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco
1962, no writ). Contra First Nat'l Bank v. Hackworth, 673 S.W.2d 218, 220 (Tex. App.-San
Antonio 1984, no writ).
194. 679 S.W.2d at 476. The supreme court implicitly overruled contrary holdings in
Wright's Administratrix v. Donnell, 34 Tex. 291, 298 (1870), and Sears Roebuck & Co. v.
Jones, 303 S.W.2d 432, 437 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1957, writ ref'd n.r.e.). See 679 S.W.2d at
477 (Spears, J., dissenting).
195. 677 S.W.2d 226 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1984, no writ).
196. Id. at 228.
197. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 15.001 (Vernon Pam. Supp. 1986).
198. See id.
199. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 21 (Vernon 1980).
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general venue statute. 2 ° °
Appealability. In Lurie v. Atkins 20 1 the court held that an order allowing
interim fees to a temporary administrator was interlocutory and not appeala-
ble. 20 2 The court concluded that the fee was an advance. 20 3 Allowance of
the fee did not become a final, appealable judgment until approval of the
final account. 2°4
Surviving Spouse Versus Estate. With a succinct opinion in Anderson v. Gilli-
land205 the supreme court has neatly dispatched the irksome issue of a sur-
viving spouse's reimbursement to her deceased spouse's estate for
improvements to her separate land. The supreme court ruled once and for
all that the proper measure for a claim for reimbursement for money spent
by one estate for improvements to another estate is the enhanced value of the
benefited estate. 20 6 With this conclusion the supreme court overruled both
the position taken in several courts that the proper measure of reimburse-
ment was enhancement or cost, whichever was less, 20 7 and the position that
the proper measure of reimbursement was cost, regardless of enhance-
ment.20 8 This opinion will apply to divorce as well as probate cases.
In Smith v. Smith20 9 an appellate court reaffirmed the presumption in-
stalled in Family Code section 5.02210 that the assets of a decedent's estate
are community property.211
In Hunter v. Clark2 12 another appellate court provided an excellent dis-
cussion of homestead rights and waiver of homestead. The court inquired
whether a premarital agreement waived homestead rights pursuant to Fam-
ily Code section 5.45,213 and ruled against waiver because the wording of the
premarital agreement did not provide the clear and convincing evidence that
section 5.45 requires to prove waiver. 21 4 The agreement included no express
200. 677 S.W.2d at 228.
201. 678 S.W.2d 510 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1984, no writ).
202. Id. at 511.
203. Id.
204. Id. Annual accounts are subject to correction until approval of the final account. See
In re Higginbotham's Estate, 192 S.W.2d 285, 289 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1946, no writ);
Cartledge v. Billalba, 154 S.W.2d 219, 226 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1941, writ refd w.o.m.).
205. 684 S.W.2d 673 (Tex. 1985).
206. Id. at 675.
207. Hale v. Hale, 557 S.W.2d 614, 615 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1977, no writ); Tre-
vino v. Trevino, 555 S.W.2d 792, 799 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1977, no writ); Girard
v. Girard, 521 S.W.2d 714, 718 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1975, no writ).
208. In re Higley, 575 S.W.2d 432, 434 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1978, no writ);
Cervantes v. Cervantes, 76 S.W. 790, 793 (Tex. Civ. App. 1903, writ dism'd).
209. 694 S.W.2d 426 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1985, writ refd n.r.e.).
210. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 5.02 (Vernon 1975) provides: "Property possessed by either
spouse during or on dissolution of marriage is presumed to be community property."
211. 694 S.W.2d at 433; accord Maples v. Nimitz, 615 S.W.2d 690, 691 (Tex. 1981);
Latham v. Allison, 560 S.W.2d 481, 484 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1977, writ refd n.r.e.).
212. 687 S.W.2d 811 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1985, no writ).
213. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 5.45 (Vernon Supp. 1986).
214. 687 S.W.2d at 817. The Texas Supreme Court has defined clear and convincing evi-
dence as "that measure or degree of proof which will produce in the mind of the trier of fact a
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reference to homestead or more general language that could include home-
stead. The court further held that, even if the terms did support waiver, the
lack of legal representation of the surviving spouse prevented such waiver
from being informed consent as required under section 5.45.215
IV. HEIRSHIP
Appealability. A summary judgment determining all heirs is a final judg-
ment subject to appeal, according to the court in Estate of Wright.2 16 A trial
court's subsequent determination that the summary judgment was not final
cannot reopen the heirship determination if the summary judgment did, in
fact, completely adjudicate heirship. 21 7 Also, the fact that the heirship pro-
ceeding was part of general estate proceedings did not necessitate a sever-
ance for appeal or in any way affect the right of appeal under Probate Code
section 55(a).2 18 Conversely, in Haynes v. Edwards2 19 a partial determina-
tion of heirship for purposes of establishing standing in a will contest was
not a final judgment. Proving his status as an heir through adoption by
estoppel, the contestant established his standing in a preliminary hearing.
Upon appeal of the preliminary heirship determination the supreme court
reversed the holding of the court of appeals that the preliminary heirship
determination was a final judgment. 220 The court reasoned that the heirship
determination was, in effect, a judgment overruling the proponent's motion
to dismiss the contest for lack of interest in the estate.221 As a mere prelimi-
nary to the contest of the will the heirship determination was therefore
interlocutory. 222
Inheritance by Illegitimates. The temporarily slumbering clash between Pro-
bate Code section 42(b) 2 2 3 and the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment to the United States Constitution 224 has once again erupted, but
the United States Supreme Court may resolve the conflict this year. In Reed
v. Campbell225 an illegitimate daughter sought to inherit a portion of her
intestate father's estate. The daughter claimed a right to inherit on the basis
that her father had recognized her as his child. Following a line of recent
firm belief or conviction as to the truth of the allegations sought to be established." State v.
Addington, 588 S.W.2d 569, 570 (Tex. 1979).
215. 687 S.W.2d at 813.
216. 676 S.W.2d 161 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1984, writ rerd n.r.e.).
217. Id. at 163.
218. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 55(a) (Vernon 1980).
219. 698 S.W.2d 97 (Tex. 1985).
220. Id. at 98.
221. Id.
222. Id.; cf Fischer v. Williams, 160 Tex. 342, 347, 331 S.W.2d 210, 213 (1960) (holding
that overruling motion to dismiss for failure to state an interest was interlocutory).
223. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 42(b) (Vernon 1980) (paternal inheritance).
224. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
225. 682 S.W.2d 697 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1984, writ ref'd n.r.e.), cert. granted, 106 S. Ct.
565, 88 L. Ed. 2d 550 (1985) (No. 85-755); see also In re Estate of Castaneda, 687 S.W.2d 465,
466 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1985, no writ) (holding that neither § 42(b) nor § 3(b) allow
inheritance by a recognized illegitimate child).
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Texas cases, 226 the court held that recognition was not a method of legitima-
tion allowed by section 42(b) and that the court would only recognize the
three methods stated in section 42(b). 227 The Texas Supreme Court refused
to grant a writ, but the United States Supreme Court has agreed to hear the
case.
228
A likely concern of the United States Supreme Court is whether the denial
of inheritance by recognition is a violation of equal protection. In Johnson v.
Mariscal2 29 the court of appeals decided that section 42(b) did not provide
for inheritance by recognition, but held that section 3(b)230 did allow such
inheritance. 23 ' The Texas Supreme Court refused to grant writ on the basis
that the appellant did not properly present the question of whether a father
may recognize an illegitimate child in any manner other than that provided
in section 42 of the Texas Probate Code. 232 The United States Supreme
Court refused to grant certiorari. 233
Since the United States Supreme Court did not consider any of the cases
holding against recognition,234 and in light of the writ history of Johnson,
the Court may reverse Reed and allow inheritance by recognition based on
an equal protection rationale. The Court may decide that denial of inheri-
tance to an illegitimate child that the father had recognized is unreasonably
discriminatory when a child will always inherit from the mother. Alterna-
tively, the Court may simply focus on the constitutionality of section 42(b)
as of 1976, the year the decedent died, which was prior to the amendments
to section 42(b) in 1977 and 1979.235 No doubt the Court will have to deal
with the opinion of the Texas Supreme Court in Davis v. Jones,23 6 which
upholds the constitutionality of section 42(b) as amended in 1979.
226. Mills v. Edwards, 665 S.W.2d 153, 155 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1983, no
writ); Batchelor v. Batchelor, 634 S.W.2d 71, 73 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1982, writ ref'd
n.r.e.); Winn v. Lackey, 618 S.W.2d 910, 912 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1981, writ ref'd
n.r.e.); Bell v. Hinkle, 607 S.W.2d 936, 937 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1980, writ
refd n.r.e.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 826 (1981).
227. 682 S.W.2d at 699. The three methods found in TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 42(b)
(Vernon 1980) are: birth or conception before or during the marriage of the parents; court
decree as provided by TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 13.08 (Vernon Supp. 1986) legitimating the
birth; or father's execution of a statement of paternity as provided by id. § 13.22 or a similar
statement from another jurisdiction.
228. Reed v. Campbell, 682 S.W.2d 697 (Tex. App.-E Paso 1984, writ ref'd n.r.e.), cert.
granted, 106 S. Ct. 565, 88 L. Ed. 2d 550 (1985) (No. 85-755).
229. 620 S.W.2d 905 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1981), writ ref'd n.r.e., 626 S.W.2d
737 (Tex.), cert. denied, 458 U.S. 1112 (1982).
230. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 3(b) (Vernon 1980) defines "child."
231. 620 S.W.2d at 908.
232. 626 S.W.2d at 738.
233. 458 U.S. 1112 (1982).
234. Mills v. Edwards, 665 S.W.2d 153, 155 (Tex. App.-Houston [ist Dist.] 1983, no
writ); Batchelor v. Batchelor, 634 S.W.2d 71, 73 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1982, writ ref'd
n.r.e.); Winn v. Lackey, 618 S.W.2d 910, 912 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1981, writ ref'd
n.r.e.); Bell v. Hinkle, 607 S.W.2d 936, 937 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1980, writ
ref'd n.r.e.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 826 (1981).
235. Act of May 28, 1977, ch. 290, § 1, 1977 Tex. Gen. Laws 762, 762; Act of Mar. 22,
1979, ch. 24, § 25, 1979 Tex. Gen. Laws 35, 40; Act of June 13, 1979, ch. 713, § 5, 1979 Tex.
Gen. Laws 1740, 1743.
236. 626 S.W.2d 303, 308 (Tex. 1982).
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Adoption by Estoppel. The equitable doctrine of adoption by estoppel contin-
ues in Texas regardless of the ongoing dispute over statutory legitimization
of illegitimate children. In In re Estate of Castaneda237 and Edwards v.
Haynes238 the courts reiterated the essential element of a promise, agree-
ment, or contract to adopt.239 Evidence of recognition and support of al-
leged children were insufficient to prove such element in In re Castaneda.24°
Prolonged custody, use of the decedent's name, and treatment as a natural
child were insufficient to prove the essential element in Edwards.24'
Equitable Conversion. The case of Parson v. Wolfe242 presents an intriguing
example of some of the vagaries that occur when an intestate individual's
estate descends and passes under Probate Code section 38.243 In Parson the
surviving husband and sister of the intestate decedent squared off as to who
would inherit separate realty that the decedent, prior to her death, had con-
tracted to sell. Section 38(b)(2) 244 provided that the husband would inherit
the property outright if it were personalty; if, however, the property were
realty, he would share it with his sister-in-law. Since the contract contained
no contingencies and the purchaser could enforce the contract by specific
performance, the court held that the contract had equitably converted the
interest of the decedent in the land into personalty. 245 Although legal title
remained in the decedent, the purchaser held equitable title.246 The dece-
dent was effectively a secured creditor.247 Thus, because of the contract, the
decedent's sister inherited none of the proceeds from the sale of the separate
realty. 248
V. TRUSTS
Constructive Trusts. Proof of a confidential relationship between the appellee
and his live-in girlfriend, whom the appellee ultimately married, was suffi-
237. 687 S.W.2d 465, 466 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1985, no writ).
238. 690 S.W.2d 50, 52 (Tex, Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.]), rev'd on other grounds,
698 S.W.2d 97 (Tex. 1985).
239. See Cavanaugh v. Davis, 149 Tex. 573, 576-78, 235 S.W.2d 972, 974-75 (1951).
240. 687 S.W.2d at 466-67.
241. 690 S.W.2d at 52; accord Young v. Young, 545 S.W.2d 551, 553 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Houston [1st Dist.] 1976, writ dism'd).
242. 676 S.W.2d 689 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1984, no writ).
243. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 38 (Vernon 1980).
244. Id. § 38(b)(2) provides:
If the deceased have no child or children, or their descendants, then the surviv-
ing husband or wife shall be entitled to all the personal estate, and to one-half of
the lands of the intestate, without remainder to any person, and the other half
shall pass and be inherited according to the rules of descent and distribution
245. 676 S.W.2d at 692-93.
246. Id. at 691.
247. Id. For further discussion of equitable conversion of realty into personalty by con-
tract, see Sanderson v. Sanderson, 130 Tex. 264, 268-69, 109 S.W.2d 744, 748 (1935); Lamp-
man v. Sledge, 502 S.W.2d 957, 959 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1973, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Hardcastle
v. Sibley, 107 S.W.2d 432, 438 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1937, writ refd).
248. 676 S.W.2d at 692-93.
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cient to justify imposition of a constructive trust in Johnston v. Mabrey.2 49
The appellee had conveyed his separate house to the appellant, allegedly as
trustee. Upon their subsequent divorce the appellant claimed the house as
her property. The court cited the general rules that parol evidence can en-
graft a constructive trust over real estate even though the deed is absolute on
its face,250 and that a confidential relationship based on a social, domestic,
moral, or personal relationship was sufficient to justify a constructive
trust.25 ' The fact that the relationship may have been meretricious did not,
according to the court, mean that the relationship could not at the same time
have been a confidential one.252
Likewise, proof of a confidential relationship between the appellee and her
neighbors was sufficient in Kostelnik v. Roberts253 to justify imposition of a
constructive trust. As in Johnston, the appellee and her husband transferred
property to the appellants allegedly as trustees. The purpose in this case,
however, was to defraud the state of Medicaid benefits. When the appellee's
husband died, she asked the neighbors to return the property, but they re-
fused. The court held that the close personal relationship between the appel-
lee and the neighbors had led to a confidential relationship, which justified a
constructive trust.2 54 Although the neighbors argued under the clean hands
doctrine that the court should not in effect aid the appellee to defraud the
state, the court held that the neighbors could not assert that doctrine be-
cause they had not been injured by the fraud. 255 In dictum the court further
commented that the imposition of a constructive trust over the transferred
property would defeat the transferees' assertion of a homestead right in the
property, since the transferees wrongfully obtained the property.2 56
In an important case, Ginther v. Taub,2 5 7 the supreme court described the
broad scope of constructive trusts and imposed such a trust on a mineral
lease, which the appellees had assigned to the appellant, because of an inter-
mediary attorney's fraud. 258 Although the appellant had not directly de-
frauded the appellees, he was a knowing beneficiary of the attorney's
249. 677 S.W.2d 236 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1984, no writ).
250. Id. at 239; accord Rankin v. Naftalis, 557 S.W.2d 940, 944 (Tex. 1977); Wilkerson v.
McClary, 647 S.W.2d 79, 80 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1983, no writ); May v. Little, 473 S.W.2d
632, 636 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1971, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Purcell v. Snowden, 387 S.W.2d
138, 141 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1965, writ rerd n.r.e.).
251. 677 S.W.2d at 239; accord Thigpen v. Locke, 363 S.W.2d 247, 253 (Tex. 1962); Hud-
speth v. Stoker, 644 S.W.2d 92, 94 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1982, writ rerd).
252. 677 S.W.2d at 240.
253. 680 S.W.2d 532 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1984, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
254. Id. at 535.
255. Id. at 535-36; accord Omohundro v. Matthews, 161 Tex. 367, 380-81, 341 S.W.2d 401,
410 (1960). Note, however, that the court apparently did not consider a public policy argu-
ment. See Wiggins v. Bisso, 92 Tex. 219, 222-25, 47 S.W. 637, 638-40 (1898) (discussion of
public policy grounds for refusal to enforce an agreement with illegal purpose).
256. 680 S.W.2d at 536; accord Lifemark Corp. v. Merritt, 655 S.W.2d 310, 314 (Tex.
App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1983, writ refd n.r.e.); Pace v. McEwen, 617 S.W.2d 816, 818
(Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1981, no writ); Baucum v. Texam Oil Corp., 423
S.W.2d 434, 442 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1967, writ refd n.r.e.).
257. 675 S.W.2d 724 (Tex. 1984).
258. Id. at 727-28.
[Vol. 40
WILLS AND TRUSTS
fraudulent misrepresentations. The attorney had represented both the appel-
lees and the appellant. The appellant was thus effectively made a party to
the fiduciary relationship between the attorney and the appellees. The
supreme court further commented that a court can impose a constructive
trust on a beneficiary of fraud, even though the beneficiary did not commit
the fraud.259
As an appellate court pointed out in Fuqua v. Taylor,260 however, a court
will not impose a constructive trust merely because a fiduciary relationship
exists between the parties and the fiduciary has gained some financial advan-
tage.26' To justify imposing a constructive trust, the transaction that the
complainants seek to undo must have been specifically within the scope of
the parties' fiduciary relationship. 262 When a fiduciary is involved in many
business dealings with a complainant, as in Fuqua, not all transactions will
fall within the fiduciary relationship. In this case the fiduciary was a geolo-
gist and the complainants were investor/joint venturers.
Similarly, in Winchester Oil Co. v. Glass 263 the court refused to impose a
constructive trust on a mineral lease when the parties were merely casual
business associates. 264 Although business dealings in the past may have cre-
ated a fiduciary relationship, the court reasoned, the fiduciary relationship
extended only to those dealings and had nothing to do with the alleged drill-
ing agreement in this case. 265 That one businessman trusts another and re-
lies on his oral agreement, the court held, is not sufficient to establish a
constructive trust. 266
Andrews v. Andrews267 is another example of an increasing number of
cases establishing fiduciary duties between parties in nonmarital or premari-
tal relationships. In Andrews an engaged couple agreed to acquire a house
together, but at the closing the man secretly removed his fiancee's name,
placing title to the house solely in his name. Upon a subsequent divorce the
court imposed a constructive trust over half of the house for the wife's bene-
fit, holding that the husband had breached a premarital fiduciary relation-
ship. 268 The court offered the interesting definition of a constructive trust as
"the formula through which the conscience of equity finds expression. '269
Obviously, despite even ironclad rules of law such as the statute of frauds, a
persuasive lawyer can use a vehicle such as a constructive trust to achieve
virtually any result by successfully appealing to a judge's sense of equity and
by arguing what the law should be.
259. Id. at 728; see Pope v. Garrett, 147 Tex. 18, 24-25, 211 S.W.2d 559, 562 (1948).
260. 683 S.W.2d 735 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1984, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
261. Id. at 738.
262. Id.
263. 683 S.W.2d 35 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1984, no writ).
264. Id. at 39.
265. Id.
266. Id.; see Consolidated Gas & Equip. Co. v. Thompson, 405 S.W.2d 333, 336 (Tex.
1966).
267. 677 S.W.2d 171 (Tex. App.-Austin 1984, no writ).
268. Id. at 174.
269. Id. at 173.
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Trust Administration. In a unusual case, Jernigan v. Jernigan,270 the court
allowed trust beneficiaries who were not parties to a suit between their
trustee and another beneficiary to appeal the agreed judgment entered in the
suit. 271 Generally, appeal is available only to parties of record. 272 In this
case, however, because the judgment directly and adversely affected the non-
party beneficiaries, the court held that they were entitled to appeal to protect
their interests.2 73 Apparently, the effect of the agreed judgment, which de-
nied the plaintiff's cause of action, satisfied the appellant-beneficiaries, but
the award of attorney's fees as a settlement to the plaintiff from their portion
of the trust dissatisfied them. Thus, appellants did not attempt to reopen the
entire judgment based on lack of necessary parties, but sought to invalidate
the award of attorney's fees.2 74 The nonparty beneficiaries prevailed and the
court denied the award because of plaintiff's failure to plead for attorney's
fees and the lack of statutory or trust authorization to award attorney's
fees. 275
The court in Ballenger v. Ballenger276 dissolved a temporary injunction
preventing trustees from making distributions to themselves.2 77 The court
reasoned that the complaining beneficiary had an adequate remedy in dam-
ages against the trustees and that the injunction excessively interfered with
the sole discretion that the trust agreement provided to the trustees.2 78
In another dispute between a trustee and a beneficiary, Beaty v. Bales,279
the court held that the trustee could use trust land without charge as partial
compensation for his services.280 Furthermore, the trust agreement, which
specified that compensation would equal the statutory amount, did not limit
the trustee's compensation to the five percent commission that Probate Code
section 241(a)28 1 provides to executors and administrators because the stat-
ute also includes a reasonableness standard.282
Trust Revocation. In a peculiar twist of events, a doctor sued a trustee bank
in Bailey v. Arlington Bank & Trust Co. 283 to revoke the irrevocable trust he
270, 677 S.W.2d 137 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1984, no writ).
271. Id. at 140.
272. See Gunn v. Cavanaugh, 391 S.W.2d 723, 724 (Tex. 1965); Grohn v. Marquardt, 487
S.W.2d 214, 215-16 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1972, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
273. 677 S.W.2d at 140. Note that TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 115.011(d) (Vernon 1984)
specifically allows trust beneficiaries to intervene in virtually any suit that would adversely
affect their trust interest.
274. 677 S.W.2d at 139.
275. Id. at 140-42. Note, however, that attorneys' fees may now be awarded with the re-
cent addition of TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 114.064 (Vernon Supp. 1986).
276. 694 S.W.2d 72 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1985, no writ).
277. Id. at 79.
278. Id.
279. 677 S.W.2d 750 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1984, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
280. Id. at 756.
281. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 241(a) (Vernon 1980).
282. 677 S.W.2d at 757. The court also held that the trial court does not have to audit the
accounting as required by Texas Trust Act, ch. 148, § 24(A), 1943 Tex. Gen. Laws 232, 238,
repealed by Act of May 24, 1983, ch. 576, § 6, 1983 Tex. Gen. Laws 3729, 3730. 677 S.W.2d
at 754.
283. 693 S.W.2d 787 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1985, no writ).
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had set up at the bank for his son. The doctor claimed that his wife exerted
duress and undue influence to cause him to create the trust. Apparently the
sole wrongful action of the wife was to claim that she was going to sell all of
his family property and spend the proceeds after his death. To thwart this
unpleasant result he had placed the family property in trust for his son. The
court defined duress as "the threat to do some act which the threatening
party has no right to do."' 284 The court directed a verdict against duress
because the threatened action was not imminent and would be the lawful
right of his wife upon his death. 285 The court next defined undue influence
as dominion and control another exercises over the mind of a person execut-
ing legal instruments such as to overcome that person's free agency and free
will. 286 The court held that no undue influence existed because no one
forced or even requested the doctor to sign the trust agreement, which he
signed in conscious opposition to the wife's will. 28 7
The Bailey case is, however, only a miniature version of duPont v. South-
ern National Bank.288 Justice Goldberg began his opinion as follows: "This
case illustrates once again the unfortunate verity that the family, although
ideally a nurturer of love and affection, often succumbs to the corrosive in-
fluence of avarice and financial calculation. We chronicle today an attempt
at economic filicide involving one of America's most reknowned and wealthy
families-the duPonts. '' 28 9 In duPont a father sought to revoke a multi-
million dollar Texas trust that he had set up for the benefit of himself, his
wife, and his son. He sought to rescind the irrevocable trust on the basis of
mistake and frustration of purpose resulting from an erroneous tax strategy.
The court held that the trust's real purpose had been to protect his assets
from his wife upon a divorce. 290 The wife, in fact, was unable to receive any
significant assets upon their divorce. The husband also unsuccessfully
sought to remove the trustees on the ground of hostility, but the court de-
clined on the basis that he, not the trustees, had generated the hostility. 291
The husband further unsuccessfully challenged the reimbursement of the
trustees' litigation costs from the trust, but the court, not surprisingly, al-
lowed full reimbursement. 292 Finally, the husband challenged the trustees'
allocation of litigation costs to income rather than principal. The court up-
held the trustees' exercise of discretion, holding that when an income benefi-
ciary causes the litigation expenses the trustees should pay the expenses from
income. 29 3
284. Id. at 788.
285. Id. at 789.
286. Id.
287. Id. Although the court analyzed duress and undue influence as separate concepts,
duress is logically a subset of undue influence. See Rothermel v. Duncan, 369 S.W.2d 917, 922
(Tex. 1963).
288. 771 F.2d 874 (5th Cir. 1985).
289. Id. at 877.
290. Id. at 884.
291. Id. at 885.
292. Id. at 886.
293. Id. at 887-88; accord Brisacher v. Tracy-Collins Trust Co., 277 F.2d 519, 524 (10th




Few guardianship issues reach the appellate level, because they tend to be
more emotional than legal and the parties generally settle at the trial court
level. Also, the incentive to appeal is smaller than in other cases, because
generally only the ward has an immediate interest in the proceedings. Estate
and trust matters, however, usually have multiple parties fighting over their
iminent concerns.
As with the filing of contested probate matters in Smith v. Smith,294 the
court in Maxwell v. Mason295 held that a contestant could file a contested
guardianship matter originally in a district court, even though a guardian-
ship proceeding was already pending in a constitutional county court.296
The court noted that the constitutional county court in question automati-
cally transferred all contested matters to district court pursuant to Probate
Code section 5(b). 297 The court then determined that to require original
filing of a suit in a county court that would immediately transfer the suit to a
district court would be pointless. 298 Any person may file a contest under
Probate Code section 113299 to the appointment of a guardian, according to
the court in Guardianship of Schellenberg.3° ° If the allegations in the contest
are sufficient to raise a fact issue, the trial court must allow the contestant to
present evidence on the contest to a jury. 30'
VII. LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENTS
Out of 1040 bills passed by the sixty-ninth Texas legislature, 302 only ten
were amendments to the Probate Code and only three made changes to the
Trust Code. 30 3
Probate Code. The most significant amendment to the Probate Code was the
one sentence addition to section 5A(b), discussed in connection with the
Seay case. 304 Next in importance was House Bill 2034,305 which drastically
denied, 326 U.S. 775 (1945); see Texas Trust Act, ch. 148, § 36, 1943 Tex. Gen. Laws 232, 245,
repealed by Act of May 24, 1983, ch. 576, § 6, 1983 Tex. Gen. Laws 3729, 3730; G. BOGERT,
LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 3802 (rev. ed. 1981).
294. 694 S.W.2d 426 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.). See supra notes 161-65 and
accompanying text.
295. 682 S.W.2d 640 (Tex. App.-Houston [lst Dist.] 1984, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
296. Id. at 644.
297. Id. at 643. The court observed that the statute gives the district court concurrent
jurisdiction with the county court. Id.
298. Id.
299. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 113 (Vernon 1980).
300. 694 S.W.2d 50, 52 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1985, no writ).
301. Id. at 52. Note that § 113 gives standing to any person whatsoever to contest or
institute any proceeding in any guardianship. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 113 (Vernon 1980).
302. See Sanders, 1985 Legislation: Real Estate, Probate and Trust Law, 48 TEX. B.J.
1322, 1322 (1985).
303. See TABLE OF ARTICLES AND SECTIONS AFFECTED BY 1985 LAWS, TEX. STAT. &
CODES ANN. 759, 853, 855 (Vernon Supp. 1985).
304. See supra notes 140-51 and accompanying text.




altered section 131306 and created a new section 118A.30 7 The legislature
gutted section 131, and inserted extensive language concerning temporary
guardianships. 30 8 The legislature, however, left temporary administrations
hanging, particularly with regard to notice of appointment to interested per-
sons and perpetuation of the appointment. Thus, the three Dallas County
Probate Courts found necessary the unusual step of jointly issuing their own
rules for temporary administrations. The enactment of section 118A offers a
new concept in guardianship law. Under section 118A, a person may, in
advance of possible incompetency, appoint a guardian subject to court quali-
fication, or he may absolutely disqualify other individuals as his guardian. 309
The provision in section 118A for advance appointment of a guardian is a
logical extension of section 36A,310 which allows a principal to designate an
agent in a so-called durable power of attorney to serve as a semi-guardian
during the principal's incompetency until a court appoints a legal guardian.
The provision for advance disqualification is, however, completely novel.
The legislature deleted from section 149B(a)31' the provision allowing an
interested person to request a distribution in an independent administration
at any time after the expiration of twelve months from the date that the
court created the independent administration. 31 2 The waiting period for a
distribution under section 149B(a) is now three years.313 Nevertheless, pro-
vision 7 in section 149A(a) 314 indicates that an interested person may still
bring pressure to close an independent administration after only a fifteen-
month waiting period.
The legislature amended section 352315 to permit an executor to purchase
estate assets if so empowered in the will. 316 The legislature further amended
section 352 to allow a personal representative to carry out an executory con-
tract that the decedent or the ward signed prior to incompetency, apparently
even if the executory contract was with the personal representative. 317
The legislature additionally enacted amendments to change definitions, 31 8
306. TEx. PROB. CODE ANN. § 131 (Vernon Supp. 1986).
307. Id. § 118A.
308. Act of June 15, 1985, ch. 929, § 1, 1985 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 6727, 6727-30 (Vernon).
309. Id. § 2, 1985 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. at 6731-33.
310. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 36A (Vernon 1980).
311. Id. § 149B(a) (Vernon Supp. 1986).
312. Act of June 15, 1985, ch. 882, § 1, 1985 Tex. Sess, Law Serv. 6453, 6453 (Vernon).
313. Id.
314. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 149A(a) (Vernon 1980).
315. Id. § 352 (Vernon Supp. 1986).
316. Act of June 14, 1985, ch. 709, § 1, 1985 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 5215, 5215 (Vernon).
317. Id.
318. Act of June 13, 1985, ch. 591, § 1, 1985 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 4515, 4515 (Vernon)
amended TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 3(n) (Vernon Supp. 1986) to include users of toxic inha-
lants in definition of "habitual drunkard"; Act of May 24, 1985, ch. 159, § 1, 1985 Tex. Sess.
Law Serv. 825, 825 (Vernon) amended TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 3(p) (Vernon Supp. 1986) to
change the terms "idiots" and "lunatics" to "mentally disabled persons"; Act of May 24, 1985,
ch. 159, § 2, 1985 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 825, 825 (Vernon) amended TEX. PROB. CODE ANN.




to allow secured creditors to initiate heirship proceedings, 319 and to increase
to $15,000 the amount of cash assets the county clerk can receive and invest
in lieu of a guardianship. 320 The legislature also enacted sections dealing
with suits by executors, administrators, and guardians, 32' and differentiating
between the effect of assignment and disclaimer. 322
Trust Code. Senate Bill 517323 added a significant new section to the Trust
Code and amended four old sections. Under the new section 114.064324 a
court may now award costs and attorney's fees for any proceeding under the
Trust Code, apparently to any party. This statute permits an unusually
broad allowance of litigation expenses. Section 113.022, as amended, 325 al-
lows the current beneficiary to occupy trust land and also allows the trust to
acquire a home for a current beneficiary. The legislature amended section
113.057326 to permit corporate trustees, if empowered in the trust agree-
ment, to deposit with themselves trust funds of trusts created prior to Janu-
ary 1, 1988. The legislature also added authorization to a trustee to make
certain investments relating to United States Government obligations 327 and
to bank trustees to receive compensation for brokerage services rendered to
their trusts.328
319. Act of June 14, 1985, ch. 692, § 1, 1985 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 5158, 5158 (Vernon)
amended TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 49(a) (Vernon Supp. 1986).
320. Act of June 15, 1985, ch. 881, § 1, 1985 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 6448, 6451 (Vernon)
amended TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 144 (Vernon Supp. 1986); Act of June 15, 1985, ch. 881,§ 2, 1985 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 6448, 6452 (Vernon) amended TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 404
(Vernon Supp. 1986).
321. Act of June 16, 1985, ch. 959, § 3, 1985 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 7043, 7215 (Vernon)
added TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 233A (Vernon Supp. 1986) to allow certain suits by execu-
tors, administrators, and guardians; Act of June 16, 1985, ch. 959, § 4, 1985 Tex. Sess. Law
Serv. 7043, 7215 (Vernon) added TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 12 (Vernon Supp. 1986) to allow
executors, administrators, and guardians to bring suit in fiduciary character without providing
security for costs.
322. Act of June 15, 1985, ch. 880, § 1, 1985 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 6447, 6447 (Vernon)
added TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 37B (Vernon Supp. 1986) to differentiate between assignment
and disclaimer.
323. Act of May 24, 1985, ch. 149, § 4, 1985 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 782, 784 (Vernon).
324. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 114.064(a) (Vernon Supp. 1986) provides as follows: "In
any proceeding under this code the court may make such award of costs and reasonable and
necessary attorney's fees as may seem equitable and just."
325. Act of May 24, 1985, ch. 149, § 2, 1985 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 782, 783 (Vernon)
amended TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 113.022 (Vernon Supp. 1986).
326. Act of May 24, 1985, ch. 149, § 3, 1985 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 782, 784 (Vernon)
amended TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 113.057 (Vernon Supp. 1986).
327. Act of June 10, 1985, ch. 341, § 1, 1985 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 2590, 2590-91 (Vernon)
amended TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 113.056 (Vernon Supp. 1986).
328. Act of June 16, 1985, ch. 975, § 2, 1985 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 7269, 7270-71 (Vernon)
amended TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 113.053 (Vernon Supp. 1986).
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